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SCHOOL FINANCE IN WASHINGTON-THE
NORTHSHORE LITIGATION AND BEYOND
William R. Andersen*
[T] he current approach to financing America's public schools is characterized by unequal educational opportunity and inequitable distribution of responsibility for the support of educational services. The inequality and inequity stem, not simply from the existence of distinct
differences in the quality of education among the schools and school
districts of the states of the nation, but from the workings of a system
by which the students who receive the highest quality education are
frequently those from the most advantaged backgrounds, while the
students from the most impoverished communities and most disadvantaged social environments often receive no better and frequently inferior educational services. Furthermore, under our archaic system of
distributing the costs of education, the communities most hard pressed
to raise revenues for public services in general, or for education in
particular, are those with the largest educational burdens to support.
Those communities that require fewer public services or possess
higher property tax bases frequently tax themselves far less, yet provide superior education services.
-J. Berke**

I. INTRODUCTION
Controversy over various aspects of public education in the United
States has been a common feature of our national life, illustrating not
only the fundamental importance of public education but also the fact
that we all feel, as alumni of the system, as though we are experts in
diagnosing its ills and prescribing appropriate remedies. We have accordingly felt free to express our opinions, stage legislative demonstrations, bomb schoolhouses, vote down school levies, throw the "rascals" off school boards, mobilize the PTA, and in myriad other ways
make the benefit of our judgment available to those operating the
public education system.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. Of Counsel to plaintiffs in Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wn. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
**
J. BERKE, ANSWERS TO INEQUITY 71 (1974).
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The current controversy over the funding of public education is
probably not different in kind from the other issues on which we have
exercised our right of free expression. This controversy, however, involves fundamental notions of equity in taxation, the efficient organization of local government services, and fairness in the distribution of
community resources. The educational financing issue has generated
in the past few years a significant number of books,' studies at the national level,2 state studies, 3 legal periodical literature4 and, of course,
litigation. 5 Recently, the Washington Supreme Court considered the
controversy in this state in Northshore School District No. 419 v.
1.

The beginning point for contemporary legal research is J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S.

SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970) [hereinafter cited as COONS,
CLUNE & SUGARMAN] which in turn builds on A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS
(1968). For a treatment of more recent developments, see, e.g., J. BERKE, ANSWERS TO
INEQUITY (1974); K. ALEXANDER & K. JORDAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM OF
SCHOOL FINANCE (1973); J. BERKE, A. CAMPBELL & R. GOETrEL, FINANCING EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1972) [hereinafter cited as BERKE, ET AL.]; J. GUTHRIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H. LEVIN & R. STOUT. SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY (1971) [hereinafter cited as GUTHRIE, ET AL.].
2. See, e.g., NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL FINANCE PROJECT, ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS FOR
[hereinafter cited as NAT'L EDUCATIONAL FINANCE
FINANCING EDUCATION (1971)
PROJECT]; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE, SCHOOLS, PEOPLE & MONEY,
THE NEED FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (Final Report, 1972) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE].
3.
See, e.g., STAFF OF CALIFORNIA SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL DISTRICT
FINANCE, FINAL REPORT (1972); KANSAS ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL BOARDS, ANALYSIS OF
A STATE SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL IN KANSAS (1973); MICHIGAN
BUREAU OF PROGRAMS AND BUDGET, SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM IN MICHIGAN (Technical
Report C .b. 1972); G. CAESAR. R. McKERR & J. PHELPS. NEW EQUITY IN MICHIGAN
SCHOOL FINANCE (1974); REPORTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON THE QUALITY.
COST AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION (1972) [hereinafter
cited as the FLEISCHMANN COMMISSION REPORT].
4. The law review writing has been voluminous and can be identified in the INDEX
TO LEGAL PERIODICALS, beginning in 1970, under the title, Schools and School Districts:

Finance, and Public Finance. Many of the studies are of particular states. Earlier treatments of Washington include Andersen, Northshore School District v. Kinnear: The
"General anid Uniform" and "Ample Provision" Clauses, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
366 (1974); Morris & Andrews, Ample Provision for Washington's Contmon Schools:
Northshore's Promisesto Keep, 10 GONZAGA L. REV. 19 (1974).
5.
As of 1972, it was estimated that 59 cases had been filed in more than 30 states.
LAWYERS' COMMISSION
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER
LAW. INTRASTATE SCHOOL
FINANCE COURT CASES (1972). Decisions to date invalidating state school finance systems include: Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971): Serrano v.

Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 62
N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273 (1973); Horton v. Meskill, No. 18 52 83 (Conn. Super. Ct., Dec. 26.
1974); Caldwell v. Kansas, No. 50616 (Kan. Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1972). Cases upholding state systems include Hollins v. Shofstall, 110 Ariz. 88. 515 P.2d 590 (1973);
Spano v. Board of Educ., 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Jensen v. State Bd. of
Tax Comm'rs. 41 U.S.L.W. 2390 (Ind. Cir. Ct., Jan. 15, 1973); Olsen v. Olsen. No.
720569 (Ore. Cir. Ct., Feb. 25. 1975). Michigan went both ways, first holding its system unconstitutional, Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972). then,
after a change of personnel on the state supreme court. vacating the earlier opinion.
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Kinnear.6 After many months of deliberation, the court in a confusing and badly split decision held that the Washington system of
educational finance did not violate state constitutional requirements.
This article will examine the dispute as it has arisen in Washington,
a state which, while an early leader in the fair provision of education,
has fallen into the same patterns of inequity as most other states. Unfortunately, the magnitude of these inequities has yet to penetrate the
legislative perception, and the character of the problem has yet to be
fully understood by the state supreme court-as demonstrated by
Northshore. It is hoped that the data and discussion presented here
will contribute to a better comprehension of the problem.
II. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR DISTRIBUTING AND
FUNDING PUBLIC EDUCATION
Public education today is big business, spending about 50 billion
dollars annually7 and employing 2 million classroom teachers8 in the
education of 46 million school children. 9 Unlike most other services
of a large business, however, education is delivered in a highly decentralized manner, with services provided through more than 17,000
essentially independent school districts organized under the laws of
the 50 states. 10
Local funding, thought to be a condition of effective local management, is another characteristic of American public education. Federal
and state revenues contribute less than half the revenue needed to
support public elementary and secondary educational systems." Even
though local governments may carry a larger share of the financing
burden, their sources of revenue are significantly limited. Taxes on
income and sales have either been preempted by other levels of government or cannot feasibly be administered at the local level. Accordingly, local governments rely on the property tax to satisfy virtually all

390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973). See E. Hain, Milliken v. Green: Breaking
the Legislative Deadlock, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 350 (1974).

6. 84 Wn. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
7. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL

FINANCE, FACT BOOK,

Table 1, (1972)

[hereinafter cited as FACT BOOK].

8. Id. Table 15.
9. Id. Table 11.
10. Id. Table 17.
11. Id. Tables 2, 5.
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their revenue requirements.1 2 As a result, the revenue-raising potential
of a local government is dependent upon the value of taxable property
which happens to be situated within that local government's jurisdiction. If the state's taxable property were distributed among its school
districts in proportion to educational costs and needs of the respective
districts, there would be no problem of fairness in the distribution of
resources. 13 But such distribution does not exist, hence substantial
disparity remains in each school district's ability to finance education.
Recognizing this disparity, but desiring to retain the local control
thought present with local funding, state governments developed a
4
variety of state grants to supplement locally generated funds.'
State supplements first took the form of flat grants to all districts,
an approach which bolstered the fiscal position of the poorest districts
while providing windfalls to wealthier districts. Subsequently, an
"equalizing" grant concept was developed whereby state aid was distributed to local districts in inverse relation to the wealth of each district. 15 This form of equalizing grant serves as the national pattern for
state aid to local school finance in the United States. Through such
formulas, the states have become more significant partners in school
finance, their contributions rising from 17 percent in 1930 to 39 per16
cent by 1950, where they have remained relatively stable.
The current controversy over school finance originated in part from
the growing recognition that equalizing programs, either by reason of
imperfections in the formulas or underfunding, were not adequately
compensating for the massive and systematic disparities in the real
12.

J. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 127 (1969). Recent

estimates indicate that property taxes account for 85 % of total revenues, including virtually all (98%) locally generated school district funds. P. MUSGRAVE & R. MUSGRAVE,
PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 327 (1974).

13. This is not to suggest, however, that the property tax is a perfect revenue
instrument. The property tax has been severely criticized over the years as being regressive, inflexible, inelastic, unadministerable and, overall, neither an accurate register of benefits received nor of ability to pay-the conventional criteria for determining the "justness" of a tax. For an excellent recent essay on the policy and economic
questions raised by the property tax, see Ladd, The Role of the Property Tax: A Reassessment, in BROAD BASED TAXES: NEW OPTIONS AND SOURCES 39, 78 (R. Musgrave ed.
1973).
14. See 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE, REVIEW OF EXISTING STATE
SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS 1-39 (1971).

15. For example, the state guarantees that a fixed millage (10 mills, for example) will provide the district a fixed amount of revenue (at least $200 per pupil, for
example). The amount of the state grant, therefore, will be less as the district's ability to
pay approaches the $200 mark.
16. R. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE 5 (1973).
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taxing capacities of local school districts. 17 Where equalization formulas are not adequate or where the. program is underfunded, poor
districts face a greater burden than rich districts in generating school
revenues.
III.

DOLLARS AND EDUCATIONAL QUALITY:
DIFFICULTY OF MEASUREMENT

Even assuming, however, that the present system of educational
financing places a greater burden on taxpayers living in poorer districts, it does not necessarily follow that children in the poorer districts
are deprived of equal educational opportunity. Before such a conclusion may be reached, it must be demonstrated that taxing capacities
and educational opportunities are significantly related. Unfortunately,
demonstrating that relationship is fraught with difficulty. For example, how can one specify the exact nature of the additional tax
burden? What -index of effort is acceptable? The district with a 20mill tax for education is generally thought to be exerting twice the
effort of the district with a 10-mill tax. But there are many difficulties
with this as a measure of effort.18 It is, at best, a crude approximation
of the actual level of difficulty faced by taxpayers in the respective districts. For example, suppose the district levying "only" 10 mills is a
large urban district with substantial noneducational expenses not
borne by the other districts. Taxpayers in the 10-mill district may already be heavily burdened by these expenses when it comes time to
decide on school millage; their lower school millage may represent
more sacrifice for them, therefore, than higher school millages represent elsewhere.' 9
Another complexity, in measuring relative tax sacrifice is the
17.

These disparities are documented in I PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL

FINANCE, REVIEW OF EXISTING STATE SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS 14 (1971).
18. See generally ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, MEASURING THE FISCAL CAPACITY AND EFFORT OF STATE AND LOCAL AREAS (1971).

19.

For example, a recent report of the Washington State Research Council indi-

cates that the City of Seattle spends 47% more per capita for noneducational municipal services than does the City of Bellevue. WASHINGiON STATE RESEARCH COUNCIL,
1975 CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO CITY BUDGETING, Al-A3 (Table 6) (1975). The practical

consequence of such cost is that Seattle's tax millage for city services is 52% higher
than the comparable millage levied in Bellevue. Thus, a simple examination of millages levied for education does not provide a satisfactory comparison of the relative
tax efforts-of Seattle and Bellevue because of what has been termed "municipal overburden." See COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 1, at 232-40.
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problem of varying personal incomes among school districts. When
the personal income of taxpayers in one district is substantially higher
than that of taxpayers in another, equal tax millages do not necessarily mean equal tax effort.2 0 While school finance reform cannot be
the vehicle for income redistribution generally,2 1 there may be some
possibility of recognizing the problem in part in school finance

funding. 22 In any event, a careful view of the notion of "tax effort"
requires that this element not be ignored.
Conceding these difficulties and accepting the premise that some
property-poor districts try harder and still produce less in the way of
school monies, a number of questions remain before one can necessarily conclude that the children in those districts are in fact deprived
of educational opportunities. It is first necessary to establish that the

property-rich districts do in fact spend more dollars per pupil than the
property-poor districts. Evidence on this issue is ambiguous and clouded with statistical uncertainty, but the available data generally support

the common sense notion that people with money spend more than
23
people without it.
Assuming arguendo that wealthy districts spend proportionately

greater funds, the next consideration is whether such additional revenues are spent on "genuine" educational inputs. If, in fact, the additional money is spent on amenities not identifiable as increasing educational quality, then it cannot be said that money alone increases
educational opportunities. Indeed, there are goods and services which

20. To consider another local example, in 1970 the median family income in the
Mercer Island school district was $18,136. In Seattle it was $11,034, and in Yakima
$8,196. Brief for Petitioners, Appendix A, Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear, 84 Wn.
2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974). Clearly, raising a dollar of school money will require more
"sacrifice" in Yakima than it does in Mercer Island, even if the per-pupil property tax
wealth of the two districts is equal. In fact, they are not and the cumulative effect of low
personal income and low taxable wealth deals a staggering blow to efforts at equalizing
educational opportunities in some districts. For example, not only is Seattle's median
income 35% higher than Yakima's, its per-pupil property tax base is 127% greater.
STATE OF WASHINGTON SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION REPORT No. 1061 (Feb.
1, 1972). Faced with this combination, for Yakima taxpayers to provide the level of
educational programs available to Seattle children seems virtually impossible. The expenditure data show, not surprisingly, that Seattle spends 46% more per pupil than does
Yakima. STATE OF WASHINGTON SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION REPORT No.

1041, at 9 (Mar. 13, 1975).
21. See COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note I, at 220-22.
22. For example, equalizing formulas which increase state aid to local districts with
high concentrations of poor residents is one technique that would help. Such formulas
have been tried. See text accompanying note 189 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 104-06 infra.
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may contribute to the comfort and convenience of students the deprivation of which would not affect the educational quality appreciably.2 4 To the extent that rich districts make expenditures of this sort,
relative educational opportunities remain essentially unaffected. Any
analysis, therefore, of the effect of money on educational quality must
account for the types of expenditures made and their effect on educational development.
Assuming that rich districts do in fact spend their additional funds
on educational inputs, one must next consider the varying costs in providing education in each school district. Two districts may be
spending the same number of dollars per pupil yet purchasing different levels of education because of significant cost differentials between the two districts. Between some districts, for example, there
may be general cost of living differences, or differences in teacher salaries, either of which would affect the real capacity of the districts to
purchase educational inputs.2 5 The degree to which school funding
formulae can be adjusted to cost differences is as yet undetermined,
although efforts are being made to deal with the problem. 2 6
Closely related to the problem of cost differentials is the fact that
different school districts often have different needs. For instance, the
makeup of the school population may differ from district to district
such that one district may have a greater need for expensive specialized counselors, security forces, specialized reading programs, specialized library facilities and other services. These differences are espe27
cially likely to exist in urban school systems.
In addition to the preceding uncertainties, it is necessary to confront the most awkward question of all-whether additional dollars in
fact produce higher-quality educational programs. Even if it can be
assumed that these additional dollars are used to provide such things
as modern textbooks, smaller classes, individualized training, more
24. For example, most would agree that band uniforms fall within this category.
Some would go much further and argue that a high percentage of educational expenditures are essentially "consumption goods" and amenities not adding to educational
quality. See Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes,

73 CALIF. L. REv. 1227, 1242-43 (1973).
25. Drachler, The Large City School System: It Costs More to Do the Same [hereinafter cited as Drachler], in POTOMAC INSTITUTE, EQUITY FOR CITIES IN SCHOOL FINANCE
REFORM (1973); J. BERKE, ANSWERS TO INEQUITY 78-80 (1974).

26. The present Washington weighted-pupil formula, see note 85 infra, is typical of
efforts to consider the cost implications of various programs in allocating state funds.
27. See generally Drachler, supra note 25.
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highly qualified teachers and greater numbers of support personnel, it
remains unsettled whether these elements actually produce programs
of higher quality,2 8 and, if they do, whether increased quality of educational programs produces higher levels of educational achievement.
Both issues are plagued by elusive standards and meager data.2 9
IV.
A.

THE LEGAL BACKDROP FOR THE NOR THSHORE
LITIGATION
Stalemate

One of the singularities of the problem under consideration is that
legislative efforts to equalize education resources or tax capacities
have been inadequate. Undoubtedly part of the reason for the inadequate legislative response has been the lack of sufficient funds; it is
simply more expensive to engage in fully adequate equalization programs. In addition, legislatures face inherent structural and political
difficulties. By definition, half of the school districts in a state are
above the median per-pupil taxable wealth. Half the districts of a state
are relatively better off financially under the existing system, because
they receive more dollars per pupil at any level of tax effort than those
school districts which are below the median. Thus citizens in the
poorer districts, in seeking legislative change, face the burden of persuading the legislature either to increase substantially school spending
overall or to achieve equalization at the expense of the wealthy school
districts. The political implications attendant to both proposals explain, in part, the reluctance of state legislatures to grapple with the
problem. Washington is no exception. 3 0
When major societal problems have not been resolved in the legislative process, action by litigants through the judicial process has often
28. The most recent survey of the voluminous literature is McDermott & Klein, The
Cost-Quality Debate in School Finance Litigation: Do Dollars Make a Difference? 38
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 415 (1974). For discussion of the issue, see Part V-B infra.
29. See GUTHRIE. ET AL.. supra note 1. See also Part V-B-2 infra.
30. It is instructive to observe that the current legislative enthusiasm for educational
finance reform in Washington does not derive from concern over the inequitable allocation of resources (which is the subject of this article), but from a series of special levy
failures. Since many rich districts suffered from these failures, they are in the vanguard
of reform today; they were conspicuously absent in the Northshore litigation. It remains
to be seen whether reform accomplished with the aid of the wealthy districts will in fact
even-out the distribution of resources, or will merely correct the special levy problem
and retain for the wealthy districts their historic position of advantage.
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filled the void. 3 1 Initial efforts to obtain judicial relief in the area of
school finance were unsuccessful, principally because the plaintiffs
presented to the courts issues which were not well suited for judicial
resolution. In Mclnnis v. Shapiro,32 plaintiffs challenged the Illinois
school financing system as violative of the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiffs alleged that
the system permitted wide variations in per-pupil expenditures from
district to district, thereby providing some students with quality education and depriving others with equal or greater educational needs.
The three-judge district court held that plaintiffs failed to state a cause
of action, concluding that the controversy was nonjusticiable because
"there are no 'discoverable and manageable standards' by which a
court can determine when the constitution is satisfied and when it is
violated. '33 The court observed that while plaintiffs repeatedly emphasized the importance of the pupils' "educational needs," they did
not "offer a definition of this nebulous concept. 34 The complaint, in
short, would have required the court to define "educational needs"
and measure existing school finance systems in terms of the degree to
which those needs were being met among students and among districts.
A similar action attacking the Virginia school financing system was
dismissed by a federal district court relying on Mclnnis. In Burruss v.
Wilkerson,3 5 plaintiffs had sought to correct inequities in the provision of resources to meet varying levels of "educational needs." 36 In
rejecting plaintiffs' claim and suggesting they seek legislative relief,
37
the court noted that it had:
neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to tailor the
public moneys to fit the varying needs of these students throughout the
state. We can only see to it that the outlays on one group are not invidiously greater or less than that of another.
31.

See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school desegregation);

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (reapportionment).
32. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 322 (1969).

33. 293 F. Supp. at 335. The court concluded that "if other changes are needed in
the present system, they should be sought in the legislature and not in the courts." Id. at
336-37. The court also rejected the further contention that the only financing system
which satisfies the fourteenth amendment is one which apportions public funds according to the educational needs of the student. Id.
34. Id. at 329 n.4.
35. 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 44(1970).
36. Id. at 573.
37. Id. at 574; see note 41 infra.
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The Principle of "Fiscal Neutrality"

After Mclnnis and Burruss, the judicial path to reform appeared
closed. However, a study published in 1969 by John Coons, William

Clune and Stephen Sugarman, proposed a new doctrinal basis for judicial action premised ultimately on the Burruss court's concession

that a court could determine whether the educational outlays for one
group were invidiously greater or less than that of another. 38 The

study reasoned that however disabled a court may be when confronting directly the question of the adequacy of educational quality
levels, the courts could deal with questions of interparty fairness. Accordingly, Coons and his colleagues suggested the equal protection
clause should be interpreted not to require any particular funding
level, but to prohibit allowing the level of educational funding to vary

as a function of irrational factors such as the fortuitous location of
taxable wealth. 3 9 This rationale is not addressed to the aggregate level
of educational services provided by the state nor to the individual

level of services in a particular district. It requires only that at whatever level the state chooses to provide educational resources, those
resources must be distributed to all children on a fair (not necessarily
equal) basis. Fairness in this setting would require only that differ40
ences in the treatment of districts be rationally justified.
The principle of "fiscal neutrality" thus provides a method by
which judicial relief can be afforded without the court becoming enmeshed in attempts to define educational quality. 4 1 As noted by the
Burruss court, invidious differences in outlays (dollar expenditures)
38. COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 1.
39. Id. at 303-04.
40. Id. at 201-02.
41. The fiscal neutrality principle was distinguished from the Mclnnis theory by the
district court in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. 280,
283-84 (W.D. Tex. 1971). rev'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 1 (1973):
The development of judicially manageable standards is imperative when reviewing
the complexities of the state educational financing scheme. Plaintiffs in Mclnnis
sought to require that educational expenditures in Illinois be made solely on the
basis of "pupils' educational needs." Defining and applying the nebulous concept of
"educational needs" would have involved the court in the type of endless research
and evaluation for which the judiciary is ill suited ....
In the instant case plaintiffs have not advocated that educational expenditures be
equal for each child. Rather, they have recommended the application of the principle of "fiscal neutrality." Briefly summarized this standard requires that the function of public education may not be a function of wealth, other than the wealth of
the state as a whole. Unlike the measure offered in McInnis, this proposal does not
involve the court in the intricacies of affirmatively requiring that expenditures be
made in a certain manner or amount.
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would be proscribed. 4 2 The California Supreme Court adopted a var43
iant of the principle in its landmark decision, Serrano v. Priest.
C.

Serrano v. Priest

In Serrano, the California Supreme Court examined a typical state
financing system in which more than half the public school funds derived from taxes levied by local school districts on property located
within the respective districts. The system was also typical in that taxable wealth varied widely among the districts. The court indicated
that the assessed valuation per unit of average daily attendance of
elementary school children ranged from a low of $103 to a peak of
$952,456-a ratio of nearly 1 to 10,000. 44
Plaintiff school children and their parents contended that the state
could not, under the federal or state constitution, permit the quality of
a child's education to be a function of the accident of local school
district wealth. 4 5 Consistent with the fiscal neutrality principle, plaintiffs did not invite the court into a debate on the meaning of educational quality but, rather, argued that the existing financing method
produced separate and distinct systems, each offering an educational
program which varies with the relative wealth of the districts. 46
The court's response to these allegations was framed in traditional
equal protection terms.4 7 The court determined that the system did
in fact discriminate among citizens on the basis of wealth, that such
a classification was suspect, that it infringed on fundamental interests of
plaintiffs; the court also found that the system was not justified by

42.
43.

See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).

44. 487 P.2d at 1245-48, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605-09. The official expenditure studies
cited by the plaintiffs showed the consequences of these disparities. The court noted the
contrast between the Baldwin Park School District (a relatively poor district with only
$3,706 in assessed valuation per pupil) which, with a tax rate of 5.4% could generate

enough money to spend only $577 per pupil and the Beverly Hills School District (a
wealthy district with over $50,000 of assessed valuation per pupil) which, with a lower rate of 2.3% could produce $1232. Id. at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
45. Id. at 1244n.1, 96Cal. Rptr. at604n.1.
46. Id.
47. The court treated the issues under the familiar "two-tiered" approach to equal
protection analysis. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969); Note, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education,Municipal Services,
and Wealth, 7 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 103 (1972).
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any conception of the test of "compelling state interest." 48 Conceding
that the state's equalization program provided larger grants to
poor districts than to rich ones and that local taxpayers in poor districts compensated somewhat for the absence of taxable wealth by
greater tax sacrifices, the court concluded, nevertheless, that "the system as a whole generates school revenue in proportion to the wealth
'49
of the individual district."
The court denied the state's attempt to identify as a compelling interest the local control of school administration and funding levels. 50
The court stated that local control of administration could still be
available, irrespective of the financing system adopted. 5 1 Moreover,
local control of the level of funding did not in fact exist within the
52
present system. The court noted:
[S] o long as the assessed valuation within a district's boundaries is a
major determinant of how much it can spend for schools, only a district with a large tax base will be truly able to decide how much it
really cares about education. The poor district cannot really choose to
tax itself into an excellence which its tax rolls cannot provide. Far
from being necessary to promote local fiscal choice, the present financing system actually deprives less wealthy districts of that option.
The court was not obliged to conduct a definitive analysis of the
question whether the variations in fiscal capacity did in fact produce
differences in educational quality. 53 The court did, however, candidly
indicate its willingness to assume that differences in per-pupil expenditures do have consequences for educational quality and cited judicial
54
authority to support the assumption.
On remand, the California trial court concluded that plaintiffs had
in fact established their cause of action and were "entitled to a judgment declaring that the California public school financing system...
is invalid as a violation of the equal-protection-of-the-laws provision
48. 487 P.2d at 1259-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619-23.
49. Id. at 1251,96 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
50. Id. at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The California court was ruling on an appeal from a trial court's sustaining of
general demurrers filed by all defendants. Hence, the court treated the case as one in
which all facts properly pleaded were admitted. Plaintiffs had adequately pleaded deprivations in educational quality. Id. at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
54. Id. at 1253 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613 n.16.
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of the California constitution." 55 The trial court opinion is particularly instructive on the question of the effect of divergent revenues
and revenue-producing abilities on educational quality. 56 The court
concluded that because "the statistical correlational research methods
employed in social science or educational research have not reached
[an appropriate] degree of reliability, ' 57 it was "unwilling to accept the definition of the quality of an educational program that is
made to depend solely on pupil performance on . . . achievement
tests ... .,,58 Rather than requiring plaintiffs to prove that educational outputs are increased with increases in educational spending,
the trial court determined that the preferable approach would be to
utilize an input measure--one that "starts with a concept that the
amount of money per pupil which a school district has to spend
governs the quality of its educational offerings .... 59 The trial court
60
was:
convinced from the evidence that a school district's per-pupil expenditure level does play a significant role in determining whether pupils
are receiving a low-quality or a high-quality educational program as
measured by pupil test-score results on the standardized achievement
tests.
The trial court thus said, in effect, that where a state implements a
financing scheme which creates different money generating abilities
61
among its school districts, there is a denial of equal protection.

55. Serrano v. Priest, No. 938,254, at 106 (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 10, 1974) (mem.).
56. Id. at 74-99.
57. Id. at 89.
58. Id. at 94.
59. Id. at 95.
50. Id. at 89.
61. The ability criterion stands out sharply in the court's opinion:
It is an inescapable fact that under the [California system) the high wealth school
districts, with far greater funds available per pupil than are available to the low
wealth districts have the distinct advantages of being able to pay for, and select the
better trained, better educated and more experienced teachers, the ability to offer a
wider selection of courses per day, the ability to provide better and a greater variety of supportive services such as more counsellors and teachers' aid, the ability
to obtain the latest and best educational materials and equipment, and the ability
to keep the educational plant in tip-top shape.
Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
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San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

The plaintiffs in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez62 were not so successful. In that case, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Texas educational
finance system which was in most material respects similar to the California system scrutinized in Serrano. The critical doctrinal distinction
between the two cases was that Rodriguez was decided solely on the
basis of the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution, while
Serrano invoked the additional limitations and dictates of the California State Constitution. Thus, the divergent results in the two cases
may be the product of the application of differing equal protection
tests: The Serrano court subjected the California scheme to strict scrutiny; the Rodriguez Court used the rational basis test to review the
Texas scheme.
The facts of Rodriguez presented the familiar picture of a system
relying on locally-generatet funds, which, when combined with the
usual marked disparity of resources between local units, resulted in
considerable inequality in per-pupil expenditures. A three-judge district court followed the California court's opinion in Serrano and held
that wealth classifications of this nature are suspect, that education is
a fundamental right and that the statutory scheme is to be subjected to
strict scrutiny. Finding no compelling state interest, the district court
concluded that the system violated the equal protection clause of the
63
fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court, however, determined that it was inappropriate
to utilize the compelling state interest test and that the alleged discrimination should be analyzed by reference to the rational basis test.
In reversing the trial court, Justice Powell, writing for a majority of
the Court, held that Rodriguez did not involve a suspect classification,
finding that the appellants had made no effort to demonstrate that the
Texas financing scheme operated to the peculiar disadvantage of any
class fairly definable as indigent or composed of persons whose incomes were beneath any designated poverty level. 64 Citing a recent

62.
63.
1971).
64.
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411 U.S. 1 (1973).
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
411 U.S. at 23.
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study, 65 Powell stated that "there is a reason to believe that the
poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property
districts. '66 Even if relative poverty sufficed to define a class, Powell
continued, there was no proof in the record of any general correlation between individual and district wealth. Thus, it could not be concluded that the relatively poorer citizens are grouped in the poorer
districts. Justice Powell also held that classification of districts by
wealth is not suspect, both because the equal protection clause does
not mandate territorial equality 67 and because classes of people so
identified are large, amorphous and unified only by the common
factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth
than other districts. This system of alleged discrimination has none of
the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
68
process.
The Rodriguez Court further held that education is not a "fundamental" interest for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. While
conceding "the grave significance of education both to the individual
and to our society, '69 Justice Powell reasoned that fundamental rights
are those interests which are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution. 7 0° Since the Federal Constitution does not guarantee
education either explicitly or implicitly, education is not a "fundamental" interest under the Federal Constitution. Having determined that
neither of the conditions for strict scrutiny was present, the Court
concluded that there was sufficient connection between a legitimate
state interest in preserving local control and the financing system to
71
satisfy the less demanding rational basis test.
In evaluating the reach of Rodriguez, particularly its effect on similar cases brought in state courts, three aspects should be noted. First,
the classification of interests and the resulting determination of the
65. Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972), cited, 411 U.S. at 37.
66. 411 U.S. at 23.

67.

Id. at 28 n.66.

68.

Id. at 28.

69.

Id. at 30.

70.

Id. at 33-34.

71.

Id. at 49-50.
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appropriate standard of review was critical. The Court was explicit in
noting that had the compelling state interest (or strict scrutiny) test
2
been applied, the system would not have survived.7
Second, the selection of the appropriate standard of review is dependent on the terms of the particular constitution being construed;
the rational basis test was applied because the Federal Constitution
does not guarantee education, either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore, Rodriguez does not foreclose a contrary result in a case instituted under a state constitution that does guarantee the citizen's interest in education. This interpretation is supported by the explicit
language of the opinion and by both commentators 73 and subsequent
74
judicial opinions.
Third, it is worth observing that in Rodriguez the Court was asked
to enunciate constitutional principles of educational finance which
would be binding on all 50 states. Given the vast differences in the
educational finance systems of the various states, patterns of wealth
distribution, percentage of state support, absolute spending levels for
education, equalizing formulas and their respective powers, and differences in the tax structures of the various states, it is perhaps not
surprising that a majority of the Court was reluctant to confront these
complexities. Justice Powell, indeed, stated as much. 75 Obviously, a
much more manageable range of issues is presented in a case before a
state court.
The doctrinal backdrop for the Washington Supreme Court decision in Northshore School District No. 419 v. Kinnear,7 6 then, involved two separate lines of analysis. Under the equal protection anal72. The Court stated:
If, as previous decisions have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's
system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the State rather than
the complainants must carry a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must
demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision," and
is "tailored" narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected the
"less drastic means" for effectuating its objectives, the Texas financing system and
its counterpart in virtually every other State will not pass muster.
Id. at 16-17.
73. See, e.g., Levin, Reform Through the State Courts, 38 LAW & CONTENIP. PROB.
309, 3 10 (1974): Roos, The Potential Impact of Rodriguez on Other School Reform Litigation, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 566, 578 (1974); Note, The Supremte Court, 1972
Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 111 n.44 (1973).
74. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, No. 938,254, at 33 (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 10. 1974)
(mem.); Horton v. Meskill, No. 18 52 83, at 11-12 (Conn. Super. Ct., Dec. 26, 1974);
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
75. See 411 U.S. at 41, 44.
76. 84 Wn. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 174 (1974).
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ysis, both the Serrano court and the Rodriguez Court agreed that the
existing school finance systems could not satisfy strict scrutiny. But
the Rodriguez Court had held that test inapplicable under the Federal
Constitution because it does not explicitly protect an interest in education. Thus, in Northshore, the Washington court had to decide
whether the Washington Constitution protects an interest in education
so as to invoke the strict scrutiny test. The Rodriguez Court had also
left open the possibility of a challenge to a state educational finance
system on the basis of state constitutional provisions involving other
than equal protection language. Both of these analytical options were
presented to the Washington court.
V.

EDUCATIONAL FINANCE IN WASHINGTON

A.

Background

The Washington school finance system which was attacked in
Northshore is typical of most state funding schemes. The state of
Washington delivers public school services through more than 300
school districts whose boundaries are set by statute.7 7 The districts
vary greatly in size, from 1 pupil in the smallest (Benge) to approximately 70,000 in the largest (Seattle).78 The total number of pupils in
the system is approximately 750,00079 and the delivery of public
80
school services is subject to prescribed state standards.
From 1832 when John Ball opened the first school in Washington8 l
until the most recent session of the Washington State Legislature,
school finance has been a subject of intense concern to Washington
citizens and legislators. The basic partnership between the state and
the localities was a normal component of the educational financing
scheme during the territorial period (1853-1889).82 Shortly after
statehood in 1889, the first official concerns were expressed about the

77.

WASH. REv. CODE ch. 28A.57 (1974).

78.

STATE OF WASHINGTON SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION REPORT No.

1041, at 15 (Mar. 13, 1975).
79.

WASHINGTON STATE RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1975 CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO SCHOOL DIs-

TRICT BUDGETING 11 (Table I) (1975).
80. See generally WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.03.030, 28A.04.120 (1974).
81. F. BOLTON & T. BIBB, HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN WASHINGTON 33 (1935) [hereinafter cited as BOLTON & BIBB].

82.

Id.at 76-81.
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inequities of the system which relied heavily on local tax levies reflecting substantial interdistrict tax-base disparities. 83 Early efforts to
increase state support for schools and equalize the tax burden met
84
with limited success.
Essentially, the school financing plan in effect at the time of
Northshore guaranteed each local school district a specified sum
per weighted pupil ($365) from state funds irrespective of district
wealth.8 5 Voters in each district could supplement the state contri86
bution by imposing additional (special) levies.
83. State Superintendent of Public Instruction C.W. Bean proposed in 1894 a mandatory county levy for schools with the understanding that in counties where the mandated levy did not produce a prescribed minimum per child, "the amount so lacking
should be made up to the county from a fund by a state levy . . . [in order to] distribute all over the state . . . the burden of assisting the weaker counties." REPORT OF
SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION 58, 76 (1894), quoted in BOLTON & BIBB, supra

note 81, at 136-37.
84. Reform efforts led to the enactment of the Barefoot Schoolboy Law in 1895
which required a state levy "sufficient to produce a sum which, when added to the estimated amount of money to be derived from the interest from the state permanent school
fund for the . . . year. shall equal six dollars for each child of school age residing in
the state .. ." Ch. LXVIII. § I. [ 1895] Wash. Laws 122-23. The funds are allocated
strictly on a per-child minimum with the result that poor districts received more (and
rich districts less) than they contributed.
As school costs continued to rise, the state levy also increased. It was apparent at an
early date, however, that an increase in state funds might be more than offset by increases in the cost of providing educational services. For purposes of equalization, the
critical concern was the percentageof state support in the overall state-local partnership
effort. In 1921, a special study commission observed that while the state levy had increased so as to produce $20 per child, the percentage of state support had declined from
30% in 1909-1910 to 20% in 1919-1920. REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE CODE COMMISSION (1921), summarized in BOLTON & BIBB, supra note 81, at

139-41. The commission noted that the state's constitutional obligation to provide
equal educational opportunities to all the state's children was not being satisfied at this
level of state support. BOLTON & BIBB, supra note 81, at 140. A bill to raise the percentage of state support to 50% passed the legislature in 1928 but was vetoed by the
governor, apparently out of fear of the higher taxes such an increase would require.
Id. at 142. The 1933 legislature enacted the "new Barefoot Schoolboy Act" which
mandated a state levy on all taxable property in an amount which, together with
other sources of school revenues, would produce 25¢ per pupil for each day's attendance in the common schools. Ch. 28. § 4. [19331 Wash. Laws 166. The Act contained
some new equalization features whereby some provision was made for differences in
the cost of educational programs by utilizing a "weighted pupil" formula. Id. § 4(1).
For explanation of the formula, see note 85 infra. In addition, special assistance was
provided to very small school districts in the Act's requirement that each district was
presumed to have a minimum of 2,500 weighted pupils. Id. § 4(3).
85.

WASH. REV. CODE

DEPARTMENT

OF REVENUE,

§§

28A.41.140, 84.52.065 (1974). See WASHINGTON STATE
1975 TAX REFERENCE MANUAL 120 (1975). The weighted

pupil formula considers such factors as the number of vocational class hours, staff experience, number of secondary school children, the size of the school district and
whether the district is a remote and necessary one. Findings of Fact No. 16, Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear, 84 Wn. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Findings of Fact].
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 84.52.052 (1974). If 60% of the voters in the school district
approve an additional tax levy, the additional amounts are added to property tax bills of
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While the amount of the state per-pupil guarantee appears neutral
in terms of district wealth, i.e., each district receives the same number
of dollars per weighted pupil regardless of the district's assessed valuation per pupil, the weighting factors themselves may operate to the
advantage of the wealthier districts. For example, the most significant
element in the weighting formula relates to staff training and experience. 87 This factor rewards districts whose certificated staff has higher
average professional preparation. 88 To the extent that wealthy districts are able to attract and retain more experienced and better
trained staff, such districts are doubly rewarded by additional increments of state money provided under the state per-pupil guarantee
formula. The amount of the bonus may be substantial. 8 9
The most significant source for unfairness, of course, is not the perpupil guarantee itself but rather the need to make expenditures in excess of the guaranteed amount. Where the legislature permits the
guarantee to fall below the cost of providing educational services, the
difference must be derived from special levies. Such levies, as previously noted, are wholly unequalized since the amount a district can

raise at any given level of tax effort is purely a function of its taxable
wealth.
taxpayers within the school district. If the school district does not submit a levy or if the
levy submitted does not receive the requisite 60% approval of the voters, the district
must proceed solely on the current amount of the state guarantee. The 60 % majority is
'required by WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (Amendment 59). At the time Northshore was
litigated, the guarantee was set at $365 per weighted pupil. Findings of Fact No. 16,
supra note 85. For 1974-75, the guarantee was $395. SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC IN-

STRUCTION [of Washington] BULLETIN No. 69-74, at 2 (Aug. 23, 1974).
87. "About 90% of the total weighting is derived from the staff weighting factor."
WASHINGTON STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, CITIZEN'S HANDBOOK ON
WASHINGTON PUBLIC SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE 22 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as CITIZEN'S HANDBOOK].

88. The trial judge in Northshore found that "the formula provides monetary benefits to districts which recruit and retain the more experienced and trained staff." Findings of Fact No. 29, supra note 85.
89. An example may indicate the magnitude of the problem. In a relatively wealthy
district such as Renton, the 1973-74 staff weighting factor was .623. In Federal Way, a
poorer district with approximately the same student enrollment, the staff weighting
factor was only .517. The effect of this difference was to make $41.76 more per pupil
available to the Renton School District than was given to Federal Way. Since these districts are both approximately 15,000 in enrollment, Renton received by reason of this
factor alone more than $600,000 annually above what was made available to Federal
Way. If the wealtheir district is able to attract teachers with more training and experience because of salaries, facilities, studentifaculty ratios or any of the other things
money can buy, the state formula increases the effect by giving the district more money.
Letter from Barbara Dunlap, Administrative Intern, Superintendent of Public Instruction, to William Andersen, June 4, 1975 (staff weighting factors); STATE OF WASHINGTON SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION REPORT No. 1061, at 3 (Feb. 21,

1974) (enrollment figures).
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State support for common schools as a percentage of total education dollars received by those schools has steadily decreased in recent
years. In 1960-61, state funds represented 61.9 percent of school
funds. 90 In 1970-71, the time of the Northshore trial, the percentage
had slipped to 49 percent, and in 1974-75 to 42.5 percent. 9 1
In addition to the decrease in the state's share of the total education
budget, there has also been a decrease in the state's portion as a percentage of the total state budget. At the time of the Northshore trial,
state contribution to education as a percentage of the total state
budget had declined from 41.6 percent in 1963-65 to approximately
35 percent in 1971-73.92 Current figures indicate that the decline has
continued since the trial, and that for the 1973-75 biennium has
93
reached a low of 26.8 percent.
The current trend is clear when a comparison is made between the
percentage increase in the per-pupil guarantee and the increasing need
for special levies. The level of the state guarantee has risen only 16
percent between 1966 and 1971 while the funds raised by local levies
have increased 275 percent over the same period. 94 Since 1972 when
the Northshore complaint was filed, the state per-pupil guarantee has
risen only 8 percent while funds raised by special levies have increased
74 percent. 95
The increasing reliance on unequalized special levies substantially
undercuts the purpose of a state equalization program in a state such
as Washington where the per-pupil tax base variations among the
state's school districts are substantial. 96 The present system which
90.

Findings of Fact No. 10, supra note 85.

91.

Id.; WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

1975 TAX

REFERENCE

MANUAL 122.
92.

WASHINGTON OFFICE OF PROGRAM PLANNING AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT, POCKET

DATA BOOK 42, 43 (1972) (estimate) [hereinafter cited as POCKET DATA BOOK].
93. CITIZEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 87, at 10.
94. POCKET DATA BOOK, supra note 92, at 99.
95. Washington State Research Council, News Release, Apr. 23, 1975.
On the basis of the facts presented in the Northshore hearing, the trial court concluded
that "the state. . per pupil guarantee of $365 does not provide sufficient funds to operate the public schools in the state of Washington. For example the mean expenditure
for all districts is $819." Findings of Fact No. 33, supra note 85. Noting that the perpupil guarantee represented only 49% of the cost of operating schools throughout the
state, Findings of Fact No. 41, id., the trial judge found that in many districts the state's
own minimum standards could not be satisfied with the per pupil guarantee alone. Findings of Fact No. 35, id. In short, the judge concluded that "the low level of state apportionment has thus compelled reliance on special levy revenues." Findings of Fact No.
34, id.
96. They range from a low of $1,925 per pupil to a high of $776,567 per pupil. In
districts with more than 2,000 pupils, the range is from a low of $8,464 to a high of
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combines a low per-pupil guarantee and substantial tax base disparities produces a formula which guarantees unfairness. Plaintiffs in
Northshore alleged this unfairness was also unconstitutional.
B. Consequences of Inequity
Since the mere fact that the present financing system places a
greater burden on districts with relatively poorer property tax bases
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that children in such districts are disadvantaged because of such disparities, plaintiffs in
Northshore had to demonstrate the existence of a number of intermediate factors. The two most obvious factors are: (1) that less money is
in fact spent on children in the poorer districts; and (2) that the reduced expenditures result in decreased educational quality and opportunity.
1.

Do poor districtsspend less?

The evidence adduced in Northshore tended to establish a positive
correlation between district wealth and spending, 97 although the degree of correlation varied to an extent with the sample selected. The
98
trial judge found that:
[w] hen the assessed valuation per pupil and the basic expenditure per
pupil through all the school districts are compared, there is a significant statistical relationship between these two variables, expressed by
the correlation coefficient of .85.
This indicates that 72 percent of all differences in spending were attributable to differences in district wealth.9 9 A sample of 158 larger
districts (containing 95 percent of the school population) showed a
lower correlation (.27) which would explain only 7 percent of the variations. 10 0 Another sample, composed of all the school districts enrolling more than 2,000 pupils, indicated that the ten richest districts

$87,467 per pupil. Within the metropolitan Seattle area, valuations range from a low of
$8,757 to a high of $35,393 per pupil. Findings of Fact No. 19, id.
97. Findings of Fact Nos. 51 & 52, id.
98. Findings of Fact No. 51, id.
99. This percentage figure is computed by squaring the coefficient (.85).
100. Findings of Fact No. 52, supra note 85.
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spent, on the average, $148 more per pupil each year than did the ten
poorest districts.' 01 It is significant in this sample that the substantial
spending disparity, amounting to a bonus of one million dollars annually in the rich district of average size,' 0 2 results even though tax
rates are significantly lower in the rich districts. The average special
levy in the poor districts was 14.7 mills while wealthy districts were
taxed at an average rate of only 9.7 mills. 10 3 Thus, such tax base disparities have the effect of allowing rich districts to enjoy both high
spending and low tax rates while poor districts suffer both low
spending and high tax rates.
The existence of a positive correlation between district wealth and
educational expenditures is not unique to the state of Washington.
Indeed, national studies indicate that such a correlation is common in
the financing of public education in the United States.10 4 Moreover,
the outcome is not limited to educational finance but affects any locally funded service. 10 5
Nor should the positive correlation between district wealth and
spending be surprising. Viewed from the residential taxpayer's position, differential taxable wealth has a dramatic effect on the tax price
of any locally funded service. The trial court in Northshore found, for
example, that in order to increase the per-pupil expenditures by $100,
the owner of a $25,000 home in the Seattle School District must pay
$25 in additional taxes, while the owner of the same home in the ad101. Findings of Fact Nos. 49 & 50, id.
102. Findings of Fact No. 57, id.
103. Findings of Fact No. 49, id.
104. A U.S. Senate study of the relationship between district wealth and district
spending in Boston, Los Angeles, New York, Houston and Detroit found consistently
positive correlations, concluding that "these patterns and examples are not isolated instances. They are duplicated in countless studies and through the official reports of virtually every State in the land. Quite simply, they are typical examples of the fiscal roots
of inequality in educational opportunity that characterize the distribution of the benefits
and burdens of American public education." STAFF OF SENATE SELECT COIMI. ON
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORrUNITY. 92D CONG., 2D SESS. 101 (Comm. Print 1972). See
also BURKE. ET AL., sapra note 1.at 5-10.
105. One commentator has suggested:
There is a strong positive correlation between tax base and expenditure levels. The
richer communities-those with extensive concentrations of business property...
and those dominated by high value residential property-do spend a good deal
more than the poor communities, by and large. But they do not spend as much
more as their superior tax bases would permit. Therefore, tax rates and tax base
tend to be negatively correlated; the richer communities provide superior services
at lower tax rates.
Netzer, Federal, State, and Local Finance in a Metropolitan Context, in H. PERLOFF &
L. WINGO (eds.), ISSUES IN URBAN EcONOlIcs 435, 442 (1968).
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joining Federal Way School District must pay $99 in additional taxes. 106 In other words, the residential taxpayer in the property-poor district of Federal Way pays approximately four times the tax price for
each per-pupil dollar generated by special levies. Such dramatic differences in tax price are generally the result of the presence of valuable commercial and industrial property in the richer district, variables which make possible the generation of an equal amount of money
(in our example, $100 per pupil) with substantially lower tax rates. In
districts with lower tax prices, then, conventional economic analysis
suggests that demand would be greater and that more of the product
would be purchased; thus a positive correlation between taxable wealth
and spending would be expected.
Levy campaigners in wealthy districts boast of the lower tax prices
available to their residents. In a recent Seattle levy campaign, for
example, a brochure in support of the levy pointed out the special
07
privileges which derive from Seattle's relatively rich tax base:'
The cost to individual Seattle taxpayers is lower than most surrounding
districts because of the concentration of industrial and commercial
property within the city.
The brochure then set out a chart showing that in many surrounding
school districts, levies that will produce fewer per-pupil dollars will
cost individual taxpayers substantially more than Seattle taxpayers
will pay. 10 8 Given the disparate tax price considerations, it should
106. Findings of Fact No. 61(c), supra note 85. For a general discussion see
Ladd, Local Education Expenditures, Fiscal Capacity and the Composition of the
Property Tax Base, 28 NAT'L TAXJ. 145 (1975).

107. SEATTLE SCHOOL BOARD, QUESTIONS
[1975] SEATTLE SCHOOL LEVY, at 3.
108.

AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE FEBRUARY 4

District

Levy

Cost Per
$1,000 of
Property
Value

Seattle

$53,000,000

$7.38

$799.40

Shoreline

7,597",000

12 .77

562.44

Edmonds

12,600,000

15.70

517.39

Lake Washington

10,900,000

13.22

685.19

Bellevue
Mercer Island

19,630,000
3,430,000

13.00
11.43

922.07
647.90

Special Levy
Revenue Per
Pupil*

*This column was not included on the chart as printed in the brochure, but was
computed by the author by dividing the total levy size as indicated on the chart by
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not be surprising to discover that with any given level of taste for educational services, the taxpayers in wealthy districts, such as Seattle,
will purchase more than will those in poor districts. For all the uncertainties surrounding the motivations of taxpayers, their behavior,
when studied carefully, tends to show a very predictable pattern in
terms of short-run economic gains and losses. 109 And on the basis of
such factors, it would be expected that at any given level of preference
for education, poor districts will spend less.
2. Does less money equal less education?
The conclusion, however, that wealthy districts expend more
money on educational services than do poor districts does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the educational qualities of the two
types of districts are significantly different. The relationship between
the level of educational expenditures and educational quality is one of
unusual subtlety. Consideration of the relationship is hindered by the
crudeness of the measuring devices, the absence of generally accepted
standards and the intervention of other complex variables which may
complicate or even neutralize the measurable effect of additional
dollar inputs on educational quality. 110 Because of these analytical
problems, courts have not been anxious to confront substantively the
issue of educational quality.1" Where it was necessary to so confront
the matter, most courts have been willing to assume that a significant
12
relationship exists between educational spending and quality. 1
The assumption that a cost/quality relationship exists is supported
by recent data on the question. The Guthrie study' 1 3 completed in
the enrollment of the districts as shown in WASHINGTON STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTION REPORT No. 1041 (Mar. 13, 1975).

Id.
109.

See Lucier. The Prediction of Public Choice Behavior in the Washington Tax

Substitution Referendum, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 625 (1973). The 1971 Special Levy Study
in Washington confirmed the expectation that the principal reason for opposition to
levies is that the tax price is too high. I WASHINGTON STATE TEMPORARY SPECIAL LEVY
STUDY COMMISSION. SUMMARY REPORT AND RESEARCH REPORTS 337. 347 (1971).

110. See McDermott & Klein, supra note 28.
See, e.g., Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Burruss v.
I11.
Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969). Both are discussed in Part IV-A
supra.

112. See, e.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 874 (D. Minn. 1971);
Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 331 (N.D. 111. 1968); Robinson v. Cahill, 62
N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, 277 (1973).
113.
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1971 reviews the early research which clearly established a significant
14
positive correlation between dollar inputs and pupil achievement.
The Guthrie report summarizes 17 studies which were concerned with
the cost/quality relationship. Four conclusions are drawn: (1) the results of all 17 studies were substantially consistent; (2) 14 of the 17
studies indicated a significant correlation between staff quality and
pupil achievement; (3) class size and staff ratios are significant factors
affecting educational quality; and (4) the adequacy of the physical
facilities within which the educational program was being conducted
enhanced the effect of these various increments on quality. The ulti1 5
mate conclusion of the review was not surprising:
[F]inally, as might be expected logically because all the foregoing
components translated the dollar costs, we find that measures such as
expenditure per pupil . . . are correlated significantly with pupil
achievement measures.
Thus, the inferences derived from available evidence suggest that
1 6
money is an important ingredient in achieving educational quality.
Indeed, taxpayers, by imposing substantial tax burdens upon themselves, implicitly indicate that money affects educational quality. Parents, likewise, are significantly influenced by the intuitive relationship
between educational cost and quality in that they will normally choose
higher-spending schools when the alternative is available." 7 Logi114.

In addition, the Guthrie study reviewed the famous Coleman study,

OFFICE

OF EDUCATION, HEW, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966), which, con-

trary to earlier studies, had concluded that students' socio-economic class was a more
significant variable in predicting pupil achievement than was the fiscal investment in
the pupils' school. While the methods of the Coleman report have been criticized, see,
e.g., GUTHRIE, ET AL., supra note 1, at 60-61, the conclusions are surely important to
understand, for they make it clear that an optimum research design tending to isolate
the effect of money on educational quality is simply not possible. Contributing variables such as the pupil's socio-economic background simply cannot be completely filtered out of the measurement process. Thus, attempts to produce judicially acceptable
proof that less money produces less education may not be fruitful. Nonetheless, while
a perfect research design is not possible, efforts to identify the relative effects of educational factors on pupil achievement are still useful and, for present purposes, highly
suggestive.
115. GUTHRIE, ET AL., supra note I, at 84.
116. This is not to suggest that all expenditures for education are of equal value
in achieving educational outputs. For a recent study attempting to identify which
kinds of inputs affect educational outputs, see Summers & Wolfe, Which School Resources Help Learning? Efficiency and Equity in PhiladelphiaPublic Schools, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA Bus. REv. (Feb. 1975).

117. The relationship between cost and quality in education is exceedingly complex and difficult to document. Despite years of research by educators and economists, reliable generalizations are few and scattered. What is clear is that when par-
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cally, teachers will prefer higher-spending districts, even apart from
salary levels, because smaller classes and better facilities and equipment mean more rewarding teaching experiences. The attractiveness
of the higher-spending districts means that such districts can compete
for better-qualified teachers. Moreover, it seems probable that most
who consider the public school system and its products believe that
money affects quality. Thus, it is likely that employers, college admissions officers and the like may make distinctions among graduates of
schools where evidence is available to them of the tangible results of
differential spending levels.
VI.

LEGAL THEORY OF THE NORTHSHORE COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs in Northshore presented three legal issues, each derived
from a provision in the state constitution: (1) that the state had not
met its "paramount duty" under Article IX, Section 1 to make "ample
provision for the education of all children residing within its borders,
without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste or
sex"; (2) that the system for distributing educational resources in the
state was not "general and uniform" as required by Article IX, Section
2;118 and (3) that the financing system denied taxpayers and public
school children privileges and immunities guaranteed by Article I,
Section 12.119
A. Educational Amplitude
The "ample provision" phrase of the state constitution raises a difficult analytical issue. If there were an agreed definition of "ample," and
if data were available to make judgments about educational amplitude, Northshore would have been a relatively easy case. Unfortunately, as a substantive standard, "ample provision" (like "quality
education," a standard it much resembles) is not a very useful judicial
concept. At most, it might permit a court to declare unlawful an eduents, with means to do so. choose their children's schools, the ones they select.
whether public or private. usually cost more to operate than the schools they reject.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE, FINAL REPORT. supra note 2, at X.
118. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2 provides: "The legislature shall provide for a general
and uniform system of public schools."
119. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 12 provides: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities
which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations."
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cational program which did not meet some bare minimum level of
adequacy. The term "ample," however, connotes something more
than "minimum,"' 20 yet there is no agreement on what provision be-

yond the minimum may be deemed ample. Like the quest for a judicial standard of educational quality, any attempt to delineate amplitude substantively would involve the court in precisely the unmanageable kinds of questions the Mclnnis12 1 and Burruss122 courts properly
avoided.

An analysis of plaintiffs' brief in Northshore indicates one way of
dealing with this analytical difficulty which does not oversell the precision of available data nor invite the court into a thicket of unmanageable standards. Plaintiffs argued that the state grant could not alone
provide ample education. The trial judge found that the state guar123
antee covered only 49 percent of the cost of operating the schools,
and that the state minimum standards could not be met in many
school districts unless additional funds were available. 124 The plaintiffs concluded that where the state contribution was so meager that
special levies were required, the state had delegated to local districts
the decision as to what constituted ample provision. Plaintiffs' argument was not that this delegation was per se improper, but that the
delegation was impermissible if the delegees were so differently situ25
ated with respect to their capacities to provide ample education.'
120. "Ample" is defined as "1: marked by extensive or more than adequate size,
volume, space, or room. . . [2] b: marked by more than adequate measure in number
or amount. . . 3a: marked by generous plenty or by abundance: more than adequate:
not scant or niggard . . . AMPLE always means considerably more than adequate or
sufficient." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 74 (unabridged 1961).

121. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), discussed in Part IV-A supra.
122. 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), discussed in Part IV-A supra.
123. Findings of Fact Nos. 10 & 41, supranote 85.
124. Findings of Fact No. 35, id.
125. Washington case law permits the state to employ agencies of local government
in the execution of state duties, Newman v. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147, 50 P.2d 36 (1935),
although the state may not use a delegation as a means of escaping its obligations under
the constitution. In re Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co., 134 Wash. 182, 235 P.
355 (1925). Plaintiff asserted, however, that:
[B]y failing to provide ample education from its own contributions, and by relying
on local supplementation, the state has chosen to incorporate taxpayer tastes and
willingness to sacrifice in its definition of what is an ample education. But the
system permits an accurate register of taxpayer tastes only in the wealthier districts. Those taxpayers can achieve education that is ample. Taxpayers in poor districts can achieve only what is possible. The constitutional command is not satisfied
where ample education is provided for some of the state's school children. In terms,
it requires that such benefits be made available to all the children.
Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear, 84 Wn. 2d 685, 530
P.2d 178 (1974).
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Plaintiffs' brief examined two districts which were approximately
the same size but which had a substantially different per-pupil assessed valuation. The wealthier district with a tax rate of only 6.9
mills was able to spend $833,000 more annually than the poorer district which was taxing its residents at 14.5 mills. Noting that the district with lower property values taxed itself more than twice as hard as
the district with high property values, plaintiffs concluded that:12 61
it seems too plain for argument that the lower spending district is severely disadvantaged in its reach for ample education. The plain language of the constitution forbids subjecting the children in poor districts to the inevitable consequences of that disadvantage.
This approach to the educational amplitude issue is procedural
rather than substantive: the court is not required to identify any particular level of amplitude as constitutionally required. As with the
fiscal neutrality principle of Serrano, the court is merely asked to insure that at whatever level the state chooses to provide educational
resources, it must permit the children in all districts an equivalent
opportunity to reach the level of amplitude. The argument, at base, is
not entirely separate from the equal protection and uniformity arguments discussed below, since the constitutional equivalency of differentially treated districts will rest on the same sort of rational justification
as is required in equal protection analysis. But framing the argument
here in terms of a procedural definition of amplitude has two additional consequences: (1) it avoids a pointless judicial debate over the
substantive meaning of amplitude; and (2) it carefully preserves the
principle of local control of funding levels by not attacking per se the
right of the state to delegate to local units of government the task of
defining amplitude (beyond some minimum level of adequacy).
B. Generality and Uniformity
Article IX, Section 2 of the Washington State Constitution requires
that "the legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of
public schools." This provision should not be read to require either
exact equality or identity of educational programs throughout the
state on one hand, 127 or similarity in the mechanical aspects of the
126.
127.
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school system on the other.12 8 Analytically, determining the generality
and uniformity of a system appears indistinguishable from orthodox
equal protection analysis; 129 the phrase seems to require like treatment of citizens except where they can be rationally grouped for different treatment, as well as that citizens within the rational classifica30
tion should be treated alike. As one California court has stated:
A law is general and uniform ... in its operation when it applies
equally to all persons embraced within the class to which it is addressed, provided that such class is founded upon some natural, intrinsic or constitutional distinctions between the persons composing it
and others not embraced in it.
Determining whether the system is general and uniform, then, requires
first, that the classifications created by the system be identified and,
second, that the justifications asserted for the classifications and the
differential treatment which results from them be examined.
The amount of educational resources received by a school district
in Washington is a function of three variables. These variables classify
school districts according to their respective differences in costs, tastes
and property wealth.
what the referent for uniformity is. Is a uniform system one in which a uniform number
of dollars is spent per pupil? Or a uniform resource input in real terms? The varieties of
meaning which the term uniform can bear are catalogued in W. NEwHousE,
CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION (1959).

128. This was all that was required by the Arizona court in Shofstall v.
Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 90, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (1973). The court was satisfied that the
legislature had been uniform in providing a "method of establishing schools."
515 P.2d at 592. The trouble with this restricted view of uniformity is that a court
blinds itself to the possibly differential effects of state requirements, and could mask
significant discriminatory effects, so long as the discrimination occurred in the same
manner in every district. Compare Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), in which
the Supreme Court considered the adequacy of language facilities provided by the
San Francisco School District, a district with more than 2,000 non-English speaking
Chinese students. The Court stated:
[T] here is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same
facilities, text books, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand
English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education ...
Discrimination is barred which has that effect even though no purposeful design
is present. ...
Id. at 566 (emphasis in original).
129. Indeed, doubt has been expressed as to whether such state constitutional provisions for "generality and uniformity" are needed at all, given the substantially identical
reach and meaning of the equal protection doctrine. See Matthews, The Function of
Constitutional Provisions Requiring Uniformity in Taxation, 38 Ky. L. REV. 503,
516-19 (1950). Prior to Northshore, the Washington court had not considered the
meaning of the "general and uniform" phrase.
130. Coelho v. Truckell, 9 Cal. App. 2d 47, 53, 48 P.2d 697, 700 (1935).
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1. Costs
More per-pupil dollars are granted by the state to districts with
higher per-pupil costs. For example, under the weighted pupil formula, 1 3 ' a district with more vocational programs receives more dollars
per pupil than a district with fewer of these high-cost programs. While
there is controversy over which factors should be included in the formula and what weight each should receive, 1 32 the rationality of allocating more funds to higher-cost pupils has not been questioned. This
classification, therefore, does not destroy the generality or uniformity
of the system.
2. Taxpayer tastefor education
The second variable which determines the size of a school district's
funds is more controversial. In any financing system in which the determination of funding levels is made in part by local voters, the
amount of available educational funds will to some degree reflect local
taxpayer tastes for education and local taxpayer enthusiasm for the
size of the tax bill. Schools in a district whose voters highly prize education and are willing to sacrifice greatly may receive larger sums than
schools in districts where voters prefer lower taxes to expensive educational systems.
Whether such a system satisfies the generality and uniformity test
(i.e., whether there is a rational basis for permitting local tastes to establish disparate spending levels), is a subject of debate between those
who emphasize the importance of equality of education among all districts and those who believe local control of funding levels is a critical
value which justifies the variation in expenditures. However one
views this dispute, permitting local variations as a function of local
taste for educational tax burdens is at least rational, 33 and therefore
131.
132.

The formula is explained in note 85 supra.
For a review of the measurable cost difference in public education which can

be factored into a school funding formula, see 5 NAT'L EDUCATIONAL FINANCE PROJECT

133-71 (1971).
133. Historically, taxpayers have preferred local control to strict equality in education funding. Most state systems today permit local voters to determine to some extent
the level of educational resources to be committed to the public schools. An entire field
of public finance literature has arisen in the last 20 years testifying to the values of decentralizing choice over funding levels for many local services. The seminal work is
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. ECONOMY 416 (1956). For general
discussion, see R. BiSH, THE PUBLIC ECONOMY OF METROPOLITAN AREAS (1971) which

collects much of the literature. For discussion specifically relating to school funding, see
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consistent with constitutional requirements of generality and uniformity. A court would not be justified in relying solely upon a "general and uniform" provision to rule that a state legislature was not
competent to select the controlling value of local control over strict
equality if the legislature chose to do so.
3. Local property wealth
The third variable which controls the disparate size of school funds
relates to local taxable wealth. This is the variable which the Northshore plaintiffs urged was without rational justification and which
therefore destroyed the generality and uniformity of Washington's
school finance system. Districts with equal costs per pupil and with
equal taxpayer and voter tastes, may have very different educational
resources if their per-pupil taxable wealth varied. A system which subjects the children in a poor district to the consequences of a low tax
base while allowing the children in a wealthy district the advantages
of a rich tax base cannot be rationally justified since spending differences flowing from disparities in tax bases are unrelated to differing
school costs or differing tastes of local taxpayers; the spending differences are entirely random so far as educational needs are concerned.
Establishing that differential resource flows as a function of tax
base disparities are unrelated to educational costs and needs does not
fully state the evils of the existing system. When the wealthy district
finances high-quality schools with low tax rates, it becomes more at-

Brazer, Federal, State, and Local Responsibilities for Financing Education, in 2
NAT'L EDUCATIONAL FINANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 234, 242-46.
The latest United States Supreme Court pronouncement on the matter embodies
persuasive testaments to the value of local control. See San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-53 (1973).
As debate over school financing has increased, questions have been raised about
whether inequality is too high a price to pay for local control. The Fleischmann
Commission in New York, for example, concluded after extensive study that permitting
variations of education resources as a function of local taxpayer tastes was undesirable. FLEISCHMANN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3. The Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations advanced the view that full state funding of school
systems was desirable in the interest of equality even at the price of eliminating local
control over funding levels. ADivisoRY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATEILOCAL FINANCES AND SUGGESTED LEGISLATION 318-20 (1970). It has also
been suggested that variations in educational services levels as a function of local
tastes is morally unjustifiable. Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing:
Towards a Moral Theory of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32, 55-57
(1973).
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tractive for new industrial and commercial developments which in
turn further increase the district's advantage over the poor district.
The nonuniformity of the system thus has a dynamic self-perpetuating
character.
A special concern present in school finance cases is whether existing
educational financing systems visit the poor with special burdens and,
if so, whether such burdens are constitutionally significant. 34 While
the Serrano court concluded that the systems do classify citizens by
their wealth in violation of the equal protection clause, the United
States Supreme Court in Rodriguez refused to reach a similar conclusion. Regardless of whether the poor in Washington could be identified with sufficient precision to constitute a constitutional "class," and
whether the effects of the educational finance system could be said to
injure this class, 135 the special burdens imposed on the poor demonstrate the system's elemental irrationality and thus illegality under generality and uniformity standards.
Data generated for the Northshore litigation demonstrate that,
when the state is viewed as a whole, there is no overall correlation
between district wealth and individual wealth. 136 The absence of a correlation is probably the result of averaging the positive correlations
found in rural areas and negative correlations found in urban areas. For
example, in largely urban King County, rich school districts tend to
have higher concentrations of poor people. 137 Contrariwise, in largely
rural Yakima county, the poor seem to be concentrated in poorer dis-

134. For a thoughtful discussion, see Clune, Wealth Discrimination in School Finance, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 651 (1973).
135. Rodriguez imposes such conditions before an alleged wealth classification will
be subject to strict scrutiny. See text accompanying notes 62-75 supra.
136. The data included for each school district in the state the median family income, the percentage of families with less than $5,000 income, and the percentage of
families with incomes of more than $15,000. When correlated across the state as a
whole, there proved to be no significant correlation between district and personal
wealth; that is, poorer families did not necessarily live in the poorer property tax base
districts. Brief for Petitioners, Appendix, Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear. 84 Wn.
2d 685. 530 P.2d 178 (1974).

137.

King County (18 Districts):
Percentage of
Families with Less
than $5,000 Income

9 Richest Districts
9 Poorest Districts
Id.
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11.6%
8.2

Percentage of
Families with More
than $15,000 Income
27.7%
35.4
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tricts.'3 8 The data also indicate that the Washington school districts
with the highest concentrations of poor people 139 had average district
wealth substantially less than the state average. While tax effort in
these districts was close to the state average, the amount of special
140
levy dollars raised per pupil was well below the state average.
Although there is no statewide correlation between district and personal wealth, that fact should not mask the effects of the system on
many of the state's poor. The cited data indicates that significant
numbers of the poor are concentrated in districts suffering from relative tax poverty. For them the system imposes especially cruel burdens. Education is a critical service, especially for the poor. When
publicly supported education is inadequately funded, the poor are
without alternative sources of supply: the cost of private education is
beyond their reach. Mobility is sufficiently restricted to make a move
to wealthier districts an unrealistic option.' 4 1 Nor is it a realistic option for poor people in poor districts to achieve quality education by
increasing their tax effort. For all the statistical permutations, no sensitive observer can fail to see the very special kinds of evil that this
system visits on the children of the poor.

138.

Yakima County (15 Districts):

8 Richest Districts
7 Poorest Districts

Percentage of

Percentage of

Families with Less
than $5,000 Income
27.2%

Families with More
than $15,000 Income
12.0%

33.5

10.9

Id.
139.

Districts with the highest concentration of poor people are defined as those with

more than 35 per cent of the families earning less than $5,000.
140.

Valuation

Special Levy

Special Levy

Per Pupil

Tax Effort

Revenue Per Pupil

$19,990

12.6 mills

$252.46

16 Districts with at Least
30% Families with
Less Than $5,000 Income

15,547

10.0 mills

146.39

5 Districts with at Least
35% Families with
Less Than $5,000 Income

9,137

10.0 mills

95.23

State Average

Table derived from Petitioner's Complaint at 29, Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear,
84 Wn. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
141. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTIONS AND PROCESSES: LOCAL AND AREA WIDE 124 (1974).
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Privileges and Immunities Clause: Equal Protectionof the Laws

Analysis of the general and uniform provision of the state constitution
appears identical with the equal protection analysis used to test differential treatments which do not involve suspect classifications or fundamental interests. What remains for discussion is whether the stricter
equal protection standards are appropriate in this case and, if so,
whether the system meets the stricter standards. As suggested in the
discussion of Rodriguez,142 the United States Supreme Court left open
the possibility that the strict scrutiny test is applicable to state financing schemes (1) if the state constitution has an equal protection
clause that is (2) interpreted consistently with the Supreme Court
equal protection doctrine and (3) if the interests sought to be protected are either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the particular
state constitution.
In Washington, all three conditions are present. The state constitution's privileges and immunities clause 143 is interpreted as being identical to the equal protection clause of the federal constitution.14 4 The
Washington court has expressly adopted the United States Supreme
Court's equal protection analysis including the two-tiered theory of
concern here. The Washington court has held that when the state
groups its citizens into classifications which are suspect, or which affect fundamental interests, the strict scrutiny standard of review is
employed: the state act is presumptively invalid and the burden is
upon the state to show that its action is necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling state interest. 145 Finally, education is an interest
guaranteed explicitly by the Washington state constitution. By making
it the "paramount duty" of the state to provide education to all the
children, the state constitution 46 clearly makes it a right of the state's
children to receive education. Under the Rodriguez analysis, the interest is "fundamental" because it is explicitly guaranteed by the state
147
constitution and the strict scrutiny test should apply.
In urging that the system cannot meet the strict scrutiny test, plain142. See Part IV-D supra.
143. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
144. "[T] he equal protection clause of U.S. Const. amend. 14. and the privileges
and immunities clause of [Washington] Const. art. 1, § 12, have the same import, and
we apply them as one." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wn. 2d 11, 37 n.16, 507 P.2d 1169,
1185 n.16 (1973) (citation omitted).
145. Seeid. at32,507 P.2dat 1182.
146.

WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.

147.

The Rodriguez Court emphasized that education is not a fundamental right
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tiffs relied on the Rodriguez majority's explicit statement that if the
strict scrutiny test applies, wealth related systems "will not pass
muster."' 4 8 Northshore plaintiffs thus urged the Washington court to
continue its salutary practice of following United States Supreme
Court interpretations of equal protection doctrine and hold that the
Washington educational finance system violates the state constitution's
privileges and immunities clause.
VII.

THE NORTHSHORE OPINION

The court's opinions in Northshore, issued 18 months after oral
argument, are badly split and do not provide a doctrinal foundation
for legislative guidance. Chief Justice Hale, joined by Justices Hamilton and Hunter, concluded that plaintiffs had not established that the
existing school finance system was unconstitutional. Justices Rosellini,
Wright and Weaver concurred in the result, expressing dissatisfaction
with the existing financing system, but holding that the record did not
show that the state's financial contribution was inadequate. 49 Justice
Stafford, joined by Justices Utter and Finley, concluded that the existing system was unconstitutional because the state failed to meet its
50
"paramount duty" to make "ample provision for education."'1
A.
1.

The Plurality Opinion
Analysis of the facts

In the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Hale disregarded the
fact findings of the trial court, dealt simplistically with complex
and subtle factual questions and failed to respond to the central legal
issues except in conclusory terms.' 51 The quality of Hale's fact analunder the U.S. Constitution because it is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. The
Court left open the question whether a state constitutional provision guaranteeing or
providing for education mandated a holding under equal protection analysis contrary to
that in Rodriguez. Nonetheless, the Court's emphasis strongly suggests that such a
holding would follow. See 411 U.S. at 35.
148. 411 U.S. at 17.
149. Justice Wright joined in the concurring opinion but also added a short concurring opinion of his own.
150. Both phrases are from WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
151. The Hale opinion has been excoriated by the dissenting judges and others in
unusually strong language. Justice Stafford referred to Hale's opinion as a "legal pygmy
of doubtful origin," 84 Wn. 2d at 732, 530 P.2d at 204, which had been "reached by an
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ysis is best illustrated by an examination of his treatment of three
basic factual issues presented in the case: (1) whether the level of state
support for schools has declined; (2) whether rich districts spend more
than poor districts; and (3) whether money has any effect on educational quality.
As indicated, the record at trial showed undisputedly that the percentage of state support of the common schools had decreased from
61.9 percent in 1960-61 to 49 percent by the date of trial. 152 Justice
Hale attempted to dismiss these figures by attributing them to excess
spending at the local level. He stated that the percentage decline in
state support "is due not to decreases of State funds but largely to increases in the school funds from local property taxes. '153 Hale ignored
the fact that educational costs have been rising and, that if state contributions did not rise proportionately, local taxpayers had no choice
but to increase their contributions. 15 4 Hale's suggestion that the additional sacrifice of local taxpayers is the cause rather than the effect of
the decline in the percentage of state support is beyond credence. In
fact, the state reduced its share of support for the common schools
because, according to the state's witnesses, education was relegated to
a lower priority position than other state expenditures, such as for
highways. 155 Whether this could be done consistently with the state
constitution was the legal question presented to the court.
Hale also ignored the finding of the trial court that there is a positive statistical correlation between district wealth and district
spending. 156 His treatment of this question is clouded, but the gist is
that some variables other than district property wealth, e.g., district

unconstitutional, arbitrary, usurpution of appellate power." Id. at 735, 530 P.2d at 206.
Others have described it as "confused and confusing" and filled with arguments "which
practically [reduce it to] . . . inconsistent gibberish." Morris & Andrews, Ample Provision for Washington's Common Schools: Northshore's Promises to Keep, 10 GONZAGA L. REv. 19, 45. 54 (1974).

152. See note 91 and accompanying text supra. The latest figures were available to
the court at the time Hale wrote his opinion since they were provided by the Superintendent of Public Instruction at the court's request and were included in the opinion.
See 84 Wn. 2d at 710. 530 P.2d at 192.
153. Id. at 699, 530 P.2d at 187.
154. The trial court record demonstrates that special levies increased 275% between 1966 and 1971, while the state guarantee increased only 16% during the same
time span. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
155. Statement of Facts, Day 4, 68-69, Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear, 84 Wn.
2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
156. Findings of Fact No. 51, supra note 85.

888

School Finance
size, average pay for the certificated staff and the district's staffing ratio, correlated highly with expenditure levels and made the correlation
of district property wealth and expenditures insignificant. 157 Testimony indicated that there was a high correlation between educational
expenditures per pupil and the average pay for certificated staff and
the district's staffing ratio. 15 8 This fact, however, merely identifies how
high spending districts spend their money; districts which spend more
money per pupil buy smaller classes (hence the better staffing ratios)
and better trained and more experienced teachers (hence the higher
average pay). But Hale's presentation of these correlations as part of his
attack on the premise that wealth and spending are correlated suggests
that high expenditures are caused principally by local desires for
higher salaries and smaller classes rather than by anything over which
the state has control. This is a sophomoric error in statistical analysis.
One could as readily explain the fact that wealthy people spend more
than poor people by attributing it to the desire of the wealthy to own
yachts; surely there will be a high correlation between wealth and
yacht ownership to "prove" the assertion. The issue here, however, is
not how districts spend their money but rather what determines the
amount of money they have to spend. On that question there was no
dispute: all the correlations drawn between district wealth and per
pupil spending were significant and positive. The trial judge concluded that "above the per pupil guarantee, the major factor determining the amount of money that a school district can raise for education is the district's assessed valuation per pupil."'159
Hale's opinion implies that the relationship between wealth and
spending is not legally significant so long as taxpayers in poor districts
157. Defendants' witness Flerchinger testified, for example, that there is a correlation between educational expenditure per pupil and district size: the smaller the district,
the higher the spending per pupil. But the very small school district (such as Patterson,
with only 5 students) naturally appears to enjoy extremely high per pupil expenditures
since the total expenditures of the district are divided by a very small number of pupils.
Findings of Fact No. 55, supranote 85. This mathematical peculiarity is, at most, a caution that one is on surer ground if one omits from the computation the smaller districts
which introduce this particular distortion. For this reason, the evidence submitted by
plaintiffs on the correlation between district wealth and expenditure levels dealt only
with school districts whose student populations numbered more than 2,000. Findings of
Fact No. 19, id.
158. 84 Wn. 2d at 700, 530 P.2d at 187.
159. Findings of Fact No. 59, supra note 85. Indeed, the Flerchinger correlations
show with great precision the very inequities of which petitioners complained; it is precisely because wealthier districts have smaller classes and more experienced and better
trained teachers that plaintiffs felt themselves aggrieved by the existing system.
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have the legal power to increase their tax rates. This argument attempts
to excuse a discriminatory effect on one class of citizens (school children) by pointing to the possibility that another kind of discriminatory
effect can be imposed on another class of citizens (taxpayers). The
argument is effective only so long as the parts of the problem are
viewed in isolation. Both fairness and clarity, however, require that
the problem be examined as a whole, and that its reciprocal parts not
be treated independently.
The difficulties involved in determining the relationship between
monetary inputs and educational quality, the third major fact issue in
the case, were largely ignored by Justice Hale. He recognized that the
record showed financial disparities, but did not conclude that educational deprivations were present. 160 Despite repeated evidence that
some school districts taxed their property owners less than others and
yet raised far more revenue per pupil for school programs,1 6 1 Justice
62
Hale stated that:'
there is no evidence whatever that one district or another provides
unconstitutionally superior or unconstitutionally inferior opportunities; nor is there evidence as to which are the better or inferior or offending districts, if any, one way or the other ....
Implicit in Hale's finding that fiscal disparities of this magnitude do
not indicate educational deprivations is the conclusion that educational quality is unrelated to expenditures; excess funds available to
wealthy districts are wasted from an educational standpoint. Because
such resources do not contribute to the educational quality of
wealthier districts, their absence in the poorer districts is not a constitutionally significant deprivation.
160.
161.

84 Wn. 2d at 694, 530 P.2d at 184.
The following is typical of the data which appeared in the record as evidence:

EnrollDistrict ment
Longview 8.192

Valuation
Per Pupil
$34.060

Levy
Mills
6.90

Levy
Revenue
$1.925.000

Franklin
Pierce 7,935

9,447

14.57

1,092,000

Per Pupil
Revenue
S234.99
137.62

Difference ............
$ 833,000
The data are drawn from figures published by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction cited in Petitioner's Complaint at 29, Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear, 84
Wn. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
162. 84 Wn. 2d at 696, 530 P.2d at 185.
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Hale's unwillingness to believe that money makes a difference in
educational quality seems unsupportable in light of the data reviewed
above. 163 As noted previously, there is adequate reason for a court to
treat massive fiscal disparities as educationally significant. Once it is
established that the financing system generates massive fiscal inequities, i.e., that it treats individuals in the same circumstances significantly differently, a rebuttable presumption that educational deprivation results should arise. The burden of going forward with the evidence should shift to the state to prove that educational deprivations
do not result from such fiscal deprivations or that such inequities are
justified. Plaintiffs should not bear the burden of identifying the
particular educational programs and/or facilities of which poor districts are deprived by the absence of funds or that additional educational inputs for poorer districts would in fact produce differences in
164
the achievement of their students.
2.

Analysis of the law

On the first legal issue presented by the complaint-whether the
present system makes "ample provision" for education-Hale merely
asserted the conclusion at several places that "there is no proof that
this State has ever failed to discharge its paramount duty . . .to
make ample provision for the education of all children residing within
its borders .... ,,165 Apparently, Hale was willing to confront the
issue of amplitude in a fully substantive sense. Just as apparently, he
provided no clues as to how one might measure the constitutionality
of any particular level of educational amplitude. His opaque, conclusory language does not provide much needed judicial guidance.
163. A recent commentary reviewed the confused state of the social science data on
the cost-quality issue and concluded that it would be a mistake from both a legal and
practical standpoint to insist on proof of output differences in equal protection cases:
Under the equal protection clause, the concern is whether government treats people
equally, not with making people equal and not with equality of results emanating
from a distributed benefit, for the latter may be beyond the capacity and power of
governments and schools to control. Where equality and equal protection analysis
are concerned, the focus is upon the rationality and fairness of how government
distributes benefits, not with what people do with those benefits. Input-output research is irrelevant to that inquiry.
McDermott & Klein, supranote 28, at 432-33.
164.

See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 86 (1972)

(Marshall, J., dissenting).
165.

84 Wn. 2d at 694, 530 P.2d at 184.
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On the second question, whether the system meets the generality
and uniformity requirements, the opinion is similarly disappointing.
66
Hale defines a general and uniform system as:1
[O] ne in which every child in the state has free access to certain minimum and reasonably standardized educational and constructional facilities and opportunities to at least the 12th grade-a system administered with that degree of uniformity which enables a child to transfer
from one district to another within the same grade without substantial
loss of credit or standing and with access for each student of whatever
grade to acquire those skills and training which are reasonably understood to be fundamental and basic to a child's education.
This definition commixes "amplitude" and "generality and uniformity"
-and dilutes the effect of both. The suggestion that generality and
uniformity mandate a minimum level of education is confusing; the
generality and uniformity clause relates to interparty fairness in the
allocation of whatever educational resources the state provides. A
system which is minimally adequate could still be nonuniform. For
example, if the state conferred special educational benefits on some
districts, the overall system might be minimally adequate, but not
general and uniform.
If it is correct to interpret Hale to mean that generality and uniformity must exist only to a certain minimum level, the threshold for
discrimination identified by Hale is too low. He sets the threshold at
the level at which the child can "acquire those skills and training...
reasonably understood to be fundamental and basic" and "which enables a child to transfer from one district to another . . . without substantial loss of credit.' 67 Given the difficulty of judicial agreement
about what is "reasonably understood to be fundamental and basic,"
the practical effect of Hale's standard is to test only whether the student can transfer without loss of credit, which is accomplished without
difficulty except in cases of the most severe deprivation. 168 Hale's

166.
167.
168.

Id. at 729. 530 P.2d at 202.
Id.
Placement of students upon transfer is generally within the reasonable discre-

tion of school authorities. See, e.g., E. REUTTER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF
PUBLIC EDUCATION 117 (1970). Conversations with school officials in Washington indi-

cate that a form of comity is practiced. With few exceptions, each district permits
transfer to its school without loss of credit with the expectation that its students will
be able to transfer to other districts without loss of credit.
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standard thus dilutes the constitutional guarantee of a general and
169
uniform school system to an insignificant level.
Hale's treatment of the third legal issue, whether the system deprives citizens of privileges and immunities, is no more satisfactory.
Hale reasoned that since the privileges and immunities clause of the
state constitution must be construed in the same way as the United
States Supreme Court construes the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 17 0 the Rodriguez Court's decision upholding a
similar school financing system was controlling.' 7 ' Beneath this superficially logical argument lies an egregious misunderstanding of Rodriguez. As indicated previously, Rodriquez implies that state school
financing systems do not meet appropriate equal protection standards
if the state constitution guarantees the right to education. 72 Since
education is guaranteed by the Washington Constitution, the Rodriguez opinion does not support Hale's result. Justice Hale simply
missed this step in Justice Powell's analysis in Rodriguez.
B.

The Dissent

The dissenting opinion of Justice Stafford conforms to the facts in
the record 17 3 but still generates problems. Stafford concluded that the
present system of financing public education is unconstitutional under
all three of the constitutional provisions cited by plaintiffs, but his
theory of the case was quite different from that of plaintiffs.
Justice Stafford held that the three constitutional provisions cumulate into a nondelegable duty of the state to provide ample education
169.

Consider the Franklin Pierce and Longview school districts noted in note 161

supra. Franklin Pierce residents, with more than twice the tax effort of Longview residents, are able to provide only half as much money for their school children; $833,000

more is available annually to the Longview children. This does not render the system
nonuniform under Hale's analysis unless it can be shown that less money in Franklin
Pierce so deprives the children in that district that they could not transfer elsewhere
without loss of credit. This way of looking at the standards of generality and uniformity

makes them insignificant.
170.
171.
172.
173.

84 Wn. 2d at 720-21,530 P.2d at 198.
Id. at 725, 530 P.2d at 200.
See 411 U.S. at 17.
Stafford appropriately regarded himself as bound by the fact findings of the

judge below since they are "supported by substantial evidence and painstakingly complete insofar as the relevant facts are concerned." 84 Wn. 2d at 742, 530 P.2d at 209.
Stafford considered Hale's disregard of the findings below as flatly in conflict with
the prevailing case law in the state, 84 Wn. 2d at 733, 530 P.2d at 205, and concluded
that Hale's decision "has been reached by an unconstitutional, arbitrary, usurpation
of appellate power." 84 Wn. 2d at 735, 530 P.2d at 205.
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to all children without the need for special levies. The constitutional
provisions create one constitutional class of all the state's school children. The generality and uniformity provisions, with the privileges
and immunities clause, require uniform treatment of all members
within that class. Stafford conceded that there may be subclassifications
among school children, but such groupings must not derogate from
the state's primary duty to provide ample education for all children.
Stafford concluded that, under the present system, there was not
equality of treatment for all members of the class since ample education was not available to poor school districts "compelled to rely on
1 74
special levies for the bare necessities of operating and maintenance."
The difficulty with this analysis is the assumption that rich and poor
districts are situated differently with respect to the compulsion to
utilize special levy financing. If the state guarantee is set far below
the normal cost of education, the compulsion to use special levies
exists for virtually all districts, rich and poor alike. The problem is
not that the poor district is forced to rely on the special levy and the
rich district is not, but that all are required to do so and that special
levy dollars are much harder to raise in poor districts than in rich
districts.
Stafford does not rule out the use of special levies completely. He
would leave to the legislature the decision as to whether special levies
which were truly optional should be permitted. Presumably, a state
guarantee of funding up to the ample level would be necessary in order
for a special levy above that to be genuinely optional. Thus Stafford
seems to have concluded that the state must make funding available
up to the ample level; it may not delegate to school districts any discretion in determining that level. Above that level, however, the legislature would remain free under Stafford's view to decide whether
local voters could by special levies exceed the state guarantee.
This formulation of the issue requires a definition of ample education. Stafford offered some highly general factors to consider in determining what is ample, such as preparing children to participate effectively and intelligently in the political system, to exercise their first
amendment freedoms, to be able to inquire, study, evaluate and gain
maturity and understanding. 175
174.
175.

894

Id. at763.530P.2dat221.
Id.

School Finance
The Stafford opinion needs further clarification in several respects.
First, it seems to foreclose legislative choice of any financing system
which would permit significant local input on the question of educational amplitude. In this respect, the opinion seems too restrictive of
legislative options. Secondly, by permitting the legislature to continue
the use of unequalized special levies above the ample level, the opinion
seems too generous with the legislature. Until the court demands that
the legislature equalize the revenue raising capacities of the districts,
any use of special levies carries potential unfairness. 17 6 Finally, Stafford's attempt to deal frontally with the educational amplitude produced only exceedingly broad standards, hardly the kind of specific
criteria which could serve as a guide to the legislature or form the
basis for an objective judicial judgment about a particular program.
And if judicial standards cannot be framed to perform those functions, perhaps the doctrinal premise is wrong.
VIII.

THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

Two fundamental policy questions must be confronted by state legislators contemplating revision of the existing school finance system: (1)
how should the state allocate the burden of paying for the school
system; and (2) how should the state allocate control over decisions
about school funding levels? The first question, which concerns the
problems associated with generating money needed for reform of the
existing system, is a difficult one. It was not, however, addressed in
Northshore or in this article.' 77 The second question, which assumes
that the funds have been raised in some manner, concerns the alloca176.

This difficulty was detected by Justice Utter who would abolish special levies

entirely. He emphasized in a separate opinion, concurring in the dissent, that the principal defect in the existing system is that funding levels are not selected by the state but

by local voters. Such a delegation to voters is unconstitutional, according to Utter, because it allows "local political and social considerations, such as those reflected in the
decisions on special levies, to interfere with the basic State guaranty of education." 84
Wn. 2d at 771, 530 P.2d at 224.

177. The problems associated with generating money for reform of the existing
system are difficult and significant, but cannot be addressed here. It is clear that reform
of the system will cost a substantial amount of money. J. BERKE, ANSWERS TO INEQUITY

116-18 (1974). It has been estimated by the Washington Department of Revenue that at
least $1 billion would be needed in Washington. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 23,
1975, at A-4, col. 1.
There is no special reason why property taxes could not be used as the source of addi-

tional school monies. It is not the property tax as such but the way it is administered
which causes the inequities which are the occasion for reform. And, Washington's property taxes are not high, compared to tax levels elsewhere. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROPERTY TAX IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
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tion of those funds and who should make the decision regarding allocation. This question was at the core of Northshore; unfortunately,
the court provided little if any guidance to legislators. It remains unclear whether or how the state constitution restrains legislative choices
as to who can determine the funding level for the public school
system.
It should be noted, however, that while the opinions in Northshore
are confused and conflicting, one troublesome thread runs through
them all: All the justices insisted upon analyzing the issue of "ample
education" in broadly substantive terms. Hale concluded that such a
quality level was in fact being provided by the state; Stafford, writing
for the dissent, reached the opposite conclusion. Justice Rosellini,
concurring, stated that while he personally thought the state was not
providing the requisite quality level at the present time, he did not feel
78
the record justified a finding to that effect. 1
The court's unanimous view that the phrase "ample education"
requires a judicial definition in substantive terms creates difficult
problems even beyond the predictable impossibility of agreement
shown by these opinions. More seriously, a judicial definition of substantive amplitude presumably will demand the same level of funding
in all school districts, as a practical matter foreclosing legislative
choice of an alternative which allows local control over funding
levels. The merits of local control aside, it is questionable whether the
framers of the state constitution intended to preclude legislative choice
in this area. In light of the state's historic commitment to local control,1 79 the current emphasis on decentralized decisionmaking as reflected by current enthusiasm for citizen participation and revenue
sharing, 180 and the growing body of literature suggesting the importance of decentralized decisionmaking over funding levels in particu-

(1974). Patterns of tax incidence must be watched carefully, however, in any expansion
of taxes. Not only will there be effects as between individuals and classes of individuals
by income, but there will also be effects as between localities. In J. BERKE, ANSWERS TO
INEQUITY (1974), estimates are made about the effect of a full state funding plan on tax
burdens and spending levels in Washington as between urban, suburban and rural areas.
Predictably, a system which does not take their effects into account in its pupil
weighting formula will redistribute substantial wealth from cities and suburbs to rural
areas. Id. at 96-103.
178. 84 Wn. at 731. 530 P.2d at 203.
179. See text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
180.
E. FRIED, A. RIVLIN, C. SCHULTZE & N. TEETERS, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORTIES: THE 1974 BUDGET 266-89 (1973).
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lar,' 8 ' some local control over funding of schools is an alternative the
legislature should be allowed to consider. If the court continues to insist that it can define educational amplitude, a vast area of legislative
choice has been eliminated, almost without discussion.
Plaintiffs in Northshore did not contend the legislature was constitutionally foreclosed from permitting local choice of funding levels so
long as the choice was not distorted by the existence of differential
levels of taxable wealth among the school districts. The Northshore
complaint contained a challenge only to the effect of district wealth
on funding levels. If that effect could be eliminated, there was nothing
in the relief asked for by the Northshore plaintiffs which would have
foreclosed legislative choice about whether funding levels should be
allowed to vary as a function of local tastes.
Assuming the legislature has such a choice, several options are
available to legislators who seek to delegate the power to determine
funding levels to local voters without, at the same time, making
funding levels vary as a function of local wealth. First, school district
boundaries might be manipulated in an effort to ameliorate some of
the disparities in district wealth. Just as political district boundaries
are periodically redrawn in an effort to place approximately the same
number of citizens within each district, a kind of "fiscal reapportionment" might produce school districts with less resource disparity than
presently exists.' 8 2 Rearranging existing school districts would no
doubt unsettle long-standing habits and patterns of homogeneity. The
same argument, however, was rejected with respect to political reapportionment because the value of fairness in the allocation of political
power was determined to be more important than the value of preserving existing patterns. A similar result is expectable and desirable in
the constitutionally protected area of education.
Boundary changes could also embrace regional school financing in
major sections of the state. This plan would modify somewhat the traditional meaning of "local control," but local-control advocates
should prefer it to shifting control over funding levels to the state leg83
islature entirely.1
Still another technique would be to separate tax revenues from
181.
182.

183.

See note 133 supra.
See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 2, at 68-70.
See CATLAHAN & GOETTEL, REGIONALISM IN SCHOOL FINANCE: CONCEPT, PRAC-

TICE, AND ANALYSIS, in BERKE, ET AL., supra note 1, at 93; WASHINGTON STATE LEGIS-
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commercial and industrial properties from those revenues derived
from residential taxation, placing the former in a special state fund for
redistribution to school districts on a weighted pupil basis. 18 4 Since
most tax base disparities flow from concentrations of commercial and
industrial properties, this kind of disaggregation could substantially
reduce existing resource disparities.
A more complicated, but in some sense a more efficient, technique
for permitting local control of funding levels without the distortion
from tax base differentials involves adoption of equalization formulas
which guarantee to each school district a fixed number of dollars per
pupil for each level of tax effort district voters are willing to impose.
Under this system, known as "district power equalizing,"1 85 the sole
factor determining what a district could spend would be the sacrifice
in property tax it was willing to make.18 6 Under this formula, the state
need not yield all control over funding levels; the legislature can tailor
LATURE,

SEARCH

TEMPORARY

SPECIAL LEVY STUDY

COMMISSION,

SUMMARY

REPORT AND

RE-

REPORTS ch. 7 (1971). The concept of regional finance has been tried on a

broad scale for municipal services generally in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan
region. The tax pooling and sharing plan adopted by the Minnesota legislature has recently been upheld by the courts. Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn.
1974). appeal dismissed, 95 S. Ct. 1109 (1975). For information regarding the
plan, see S. BALDINGER, PLANNING AND GOVERNING THE METROPOLIS: THE TWIN
CITIES EXPERIENCE

(1970).

184. See Schoettle, Judicial Requirements for School Finance and Property Tax
Redesign: The Rapidly Evolving Case Law, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 455, 466 (1972).
185. COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 1, at 200-44. A number of states, including Colorado, Illinois and Michigan, have recently adopted variations of the district power equalizing formula. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-50-105 (1973); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 122. §§ 18-1. 18-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975): MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15.1919(501) et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
186. Assume the state adopted the following schedule:
Locally Chosen
Permitted District
Tax Rate
Expenditure per Pupil
10 mills
11
12
13

$ 500
550
600
650

1,450
29
30
1,500
Rich districts and poor districts choosing to tax at 12 mills could provide a $600 education. Rich districts and poor districts choosing to tax at 30 mills could provide a S 1.500
education. These amounts would be available regardless of whether the rate imposed
generated more or less than the permitted expenditure per pupil; if two districts, one
rich and one poor, impose a tax of 12 mills, any "excess" funds (more than $600 per
pupil) raised by the rich districts would be recaptured by the state where it would ultimately provide funds to the poor districts whose tax rate, even though equal to that of
the richer district, did not raise $600.
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the formula to achieve whatever blend of state/local control it regards
as desirable. Local choice could be given effect within a range defined
by a state minimum and a state maximum level of expenditures per
pupil.
Moreover, a power equalizing system need ignore neither differences in district costs nor non-educational tax burdens. Cost differentials could be accounted for by use of the weighted pupil formula device which recognizes high cost pupils, programs and regions. 187 The
special problem of municipal overburden 188 could be dealt with by the
use of more precise measures of local tax effort. For example, a different schedule of tax effort could be devised for urban areas which
would in some degree reflect the fact that those areas have higher tax
millages for noneducational expenses. Alternatively, urban areas
could be assisted by measuring fiscal capacity on a per capita rather
than a per pupil basis. In addition, special target groups, such as children from low income families, could be identified and provided with
special state grants above and beyond the return from equalizing for89
mulas.
The power equalizing concept is consistent with achievement of
whatever levels of true program equality the legislature desires. The
state may adopt whatever specific standards or requirements it wishes
to insure more equality and less local control over elements deemed
especially in need of statewide uniformity or program needs too fragile to be left to the control of local voters. The range of options is infinite. The significant point is that it is possible to decentralize control
over funding levels without such levels varying as a function of district
wealth, without conceding legitimate state interests in the overall level
of funding and without neglecting other basic state policies.
If the people of the state ultimately prefer that decisions over
funding levels be centralized at the state level, the solution is a fullyfunded state system in which virtually no local determination of
funding levels is permitted. Full state control of funding levels does

187.

The alternatives are suggested in J. BERKE, ANSWERS TO INEQUITY 111-15

(1974). Colorado and Michigan include a factor to account for "municipal overburden."
See Grubb, The First Round of Legislative Reforms in the Post-Serrano World, 38 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 458,466 (1974).

188. For discussion of municipal overburden, see note 19 supra.
189 Such a formula is included in the plan adopted by Colorado. See Grubb, supra
note 187, at 474.
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not necessarily mean full state control of educational programs, although many will argue that the two are inextricable. While the pressures can be substantial, recent experience with general revenue
sharing and federal bloc-grant programs indicates that considerable
local discretion regarding the substance of programs can be preserved
in a system where funding levels are set centrally. 90 It is also possible
for a centralized funding system to permit some local variation in the
funding level and some state proposals have indicated such an option. 191
The degree of local override must be fairly small, however, if the basic
policy of statewide equality is to be preserved. Moreover, local options
above the state funding levels should not vary as a function of district
wealth but should also be fully equalized. Otherwise, substantial enrichment benefits to wealthy districts could persist.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Northshore litigation publicized the widespread fiscal inequities
in the state's school financing system and some measure of legislative
reform is sure to follow. Regrettably, the litigation did not produce
much in the way of judicial guidance for the legislative effort. If further litigation proves necessary, it is hoped that the court will avoid
the acrimonious and judicially unresolvable argument over the substantive meaning of quality (or ample) education and focus instead on
the admittedly less exciting, but nevertheless crucial, judicial question
presented by litigation of this type: whether the state should be required to give compelling justifications for its markedly different treatment of school children. The question is both legitimate and important, and to answer it a court need not venture beyond the conventional bounds of the judicial function.

190. Michelson, What is a "Just" System for Financing Schools? An Evaluation of
Alternative Reformns, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 436, 458 (1974); B. LEVIN & M.
COHEN, LEVELS OF STATE AID RELATED TO STATE RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL SCHOOL DIS-

TRICT DECISION-MAKING (1973); Memorandum of James B. Conant. Mar. 22, 1968,
reprinted in 1 FLEISCHMANN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.10-.11 (1972).
191.
See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 17301 (West Supp. 1975); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 22-50-101 et seq. (1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.1919(501) et seq.
(Cum. Supp. 1975).
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